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Debiasing Macroprudential Policy: Part 1  
An Evidence-based Approach and the Precautionary Principle 
A Keller*  
 
 “It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future” Yogi Berra. 
 
Evidence-based policy refers to “a process that, to the fullest extent possible, transparently 
uses rigorous and tested evidence in the design, implementation, and refinement of policy to 
meet designated policy objectives”.1 The rationale behind the idea is intuitive. Where a 
decision-making process is based on robust evidence it will bring better quality decisions. 
Accordingly, the term is often used in policymakers’ communications to explain and perhaps 
legitimise their policy decisions. Blair’s Labour government, for instance, supported the 
approach of ‘what counts is what works’, pledging that –  
 
“We will improve our use of evidence and research so that we understand better the 
problems we are trying to address. We must make more use of pilot schemes to 
encourage innovations and test whether they work. We will ensure that all policies 
and programmes are clearly specified and evaluated, and that the lessons of success 
and failure are communicated and acted upon.” 2 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the need, the nature and the potential challenges 
and limitations of exercising an evidence-based approach in macroprudential policymaking. 
Macroprudential perspective focuses on the financial system as a whole, as distinct from 
individual financial institutions. It is aimed at limiting the likelihood of failure and 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, King’s College London. I would like to thank my colleagues, Professor Eva Lomnicka and 
Prof Michael Schillig for their comments. The usual disclaimers apply.   
1 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Strengthening Evidence-based Policy in the Australian 
Federation, Roundtable Proceedings Vol 2 Background Paper (Canberra, 17-18 August 2009) 
available at <www.pc.gov.au/research/supporting/strengthening-evidence/roundtable-proceedings-
volume2.pdf> accessed 10 June 2018. This definition reflects the need to implement an evidence-based 
approach throughout the full policy cycle (mandate, analysis and use of powers and evaluation and 
accountability). 
2 Cabinet Office White Paper Modernising Government (London, 1999). Though there may be a gap between 
aspiration and practice, seeJ Rutter, ‘Evidence and Evaluation in Policy Making A Problem of Supply or 
Demand?’ (2012) Institute for Government available at <www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk> accessed 25 May 
2018. The rhetoric of an evidence-based policy is not unique to the UK. See, for instance, K Rudd, Address to 
heads of agencies and members of the senior executive services, Great Hall, Parliament House, Canberra, 30 
April 2008 available at <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0226.cfm> accessed 10 June 2018. 
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corresponding costs of a significant portion of the financial system, often referred to as 
preventing or mitigating systemic risks. Macroprudential supervision emphasises, therefore, 
that actions that may seem reasonable or even desirable from the perspective of individual 
financial institutions may weaken system-wide stability and be unwelcome from a 
macroprudential perspective.3 This tension can be attributed to the fact that risks taken by 
individual financial institutions may be ultimately borne by the system as a whole, i.e. they 
create externalities.4 These externalities can range from those related to fire sales to those 
related to interconnectedness in the financial system arising from various sources, such as 
interbank market exposure or feedback from the real economy. 
Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the adoption of legal frameworks for the 
conduct of macroprudential policy around the globe was done in somewhat a hasty fashion, 
often borrowing from existing mechanisms applied in other policy areas, in particular, 
monetary policy and financial supervision. This paper takes a step back and attempts to 
critically look at this relatively new policy area5 through an evidence-based lens. The exercise 
exposes the potential biases in the selection and use of evidence in the macroprudential 
sphere and in turn, allows for the emergence and development of tailored legal and 
institutional mechanisms to ameliorate these biases.   
The paper explores three questions: What are the justifications for an evidence-based 
approach in macroprudential policy-making? What are the challenges and limitations of this 
approach? What are the legal and institutional mechanisms that could mitigate these 
deficiencies?  
To address these questions, the paper draws on public policy literature and in 
particular, it interacts with more recent scholarship on the politics of evidence which 
promotes the good governance of evidence.6  
Following this introduction, the paper is structured in three parts. Section 1 explores 
the nature of an evidence-based approach in the sphere of macroprudential policymaking and 
                                                          
3 M Brunnermeier and others, ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation’ [2009] Geneva Report on 
the World Economy 11, 6 naming this phenomenon ‘fallacy of composition’.   
4 ibid, 20; G De Nicolò, G Favara and L Ratnovski, ‘Externalities and Macroprudential Policy’ [2012] IMF Staff 
Discussion Note 5.   
5 The first appearance of the term macro-prudential in an international context dates back to 1979 see P 
Clement, ‘The Term ‘Macroprudential’: Origins and Evolution’ (2010) Bank of International Settlement 
Quarterly Review, 59.   
See also A Crockett, ‘Marrying the Micro- and Macro-prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability’ (11th 
International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Basel, September 2000).   
6 For instance, J Parkhurst, The Politics of Evidence: From Evidence-based Policy to the Good Governance of 
Evidence (Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policies, 2017).  
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analyses the strong justifications supporting this approach. Section 2 highlights the challenges 
and limitations that an evidence-based approach may entail in the context of macroprudential 
policymaking. In particular, it explores the unique biases prevalent in choosing and analysing 
evidence for macroprudential regulation and supervision purposes. Section 2 concludes with 
an analysis of emerging scholarship that borrows the precautionary principle from 
environmental law and applies it to macroprudential policy decision making. This scholarship 
suggests that there are situations in which in order to meet their designated policy 
objective(s), macroprudential supervisors will have to make a policy decision and use their 
powers even in the absence of rigorous and tested evidence. The paper challenges this 
emerging scholarship; lays out the difficulties in operationalising the precautionary principle 
in macroprudential policymaking and assesses alternative concepts. Section 3 suggests 
institutional and legal ways to address the identified challenges of an evidence-based 
approach. More specifically, it promotes diversity as a key tool in debiasing macroprudential 
decision making. The nature of diversity, its key dimensions and formulations in the sphere 
of macroprudential policy will be further explored in the continuation article, ‘Debiasing 
Macroprudential Policy: Part 2’. With good governance safeguards in place, an evidence-
based policy approach can and should be used as a rhetorical and practical policymaking tool 
to legitimise policy decisions and enhance their effectiveness.   
 
In this paper, evidence for macroprudential purposes is taken in its broadest sense to 
include all sources of data collected for the purposes of monitoring the build-up of systemic 
risks to financial stability. This includes evidence collected from various sources ranging 
from financial institutions, supervisors, private registries or repositories as well as market 
intelligence. As long as the data is “fit for purpose”, i.e. it is gathered with the aim of 
achieving the mandate of the relevant macroprudential supervisor and/or regulator, it will be 
considered evidence for the purposes of this paper. Evidence refers to pre-existing evidence 
which informs the policy decision and post-policy action (or the lack thereof) which 
evaluates the effectiveness of the instruments used and whether they meet the policy 
objective(s). The quality of that evidence, the way it is chosen, analysed and assessed are 
vital components of evidence-based policymaking and should form part of the legal and 
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institutional framework of macroprudential supervision. Generally, high-quality data (or good 
evidence) is taken to be comprehensive but not excessive, comparable, timely and accurate.7   
 
1. Justifications for an evidence-based approach in macroprudential policy-making 
The roots of an evidence-based approach can be traced back to medicine in the early 1990s.8  
Gradually, it expanded to many other non-technical fields, notably public policy.9 However,  
the role of evidence in public policy is fundamentally different from disciplines of technical  
problem-solving given the fluid nature (as opposed to a matter of fact) of the subject matter.  
Nick Black, a professor of Health Services Research observed that – “…research has only a  
limited role because governance policies are driven by ideology, value judgments, financial  
stringency, economic theory, political expediency, and intellectual fashion.” 10 This  
observation applies, to some extent, to macroprudential regulation and supervision. It is trite  
knowledge that macroprudential policymaking entails a careful balancing act between  
financial stability and economic growth, potential trade-offs with other long-established  
policy areas11 and as we shall see, may involve decisions with a visible and immediate  
distributional effect. Acknowledging these potential trade-offs, competing considerations and  
the somewhat amorphic objective(s) of macroprudential policy does not, however, mean that  
relying on evidence is bound to fail.12 On the contrary, there are very strong justifications for  
                                                          
7 For a detailed discussion on quality features of data collected for macroprudential purposes. See A Keller, 
‘Collecting Data: How will the ESRB Overcome the First Hurdle Towards Effective Macroprudential 
Supervision? (2013) 24(4) European Business Law Review, 487-535. 
8 The term was coined by GH Guyatt, ‘Evidence-Based Medicine’ (1991) American College of Physicians 
Journal Club, though it appears that its roots go much further back: see R Smith and D Rennie, ‘Evidence Based 
Medicine: An Oral History’ (2014) BMJ, 348 available at <www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g> accessed 25 May 
2018; For an overview of an evidence-based policy see also S Nutley, H Davies and I Walter, ‘Past, Present, and 
Possible Futures of Evidence-based Policy’ in G Argyrous (ed), Evidence for Policy and Decision Making: A 
Practical Guide (University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2009) 1, 3. 
9 n 2; In macroprudential policy making see, for instance, Sharon Connery (Deputy Governor Central Bank of 
Ireland), Macro-prudential Policy Making: Where is the Evidence? (Joint Banco de Portugal - European Central 
Bank Conference on Macro-prudential Policymaking, 17 November 2017).  
10 N Black, ‘Evidence Based Policy: Proceed with Care’ (2001) BMJ 323 available at 
<www.bmj.com/content/323/7307/275> accessed 25 May 2018.  
11 International Monetary Fund, ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ June 2013 available at   
<www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013b.pdf> accessed 19 April 2018, 24; A Clark and A Large, 
Macroprudential Policy: Addressing the Things We Don’t Know’ (2011) Group of Thirty Occasional Papers 83, 
19. However, empirical research on the specificities of these interactions and trade-offs is still lagging behind. 
12 H Rittel and M Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’ (1973) 4(2) Policy Sciences 155 
contended that in public policy the search for scientific bases is bound to fail because of the nature of the 
problem (“wicked problem’) which is characterised by its ‘intractability’ (i.e. appeals to evidence are unable to 
provide policy resolution). Whilst macroprudential policy making involves complex choices as to a public good 
(financial stability), it is a technical-empirical policy area that does not fit within the intractability nature. It 
cannot be said to present a problem that necessitates “a political judgment for resolution” (Rittel and Webber, p 
160). On the contrary, macroprudential supervisors should be independent and isolated from political and 
industry pressure to achieve their goal. Moreover, acknowledging conflicts and trades offs does not make 
evidence irrelevant. See Parkhurst, The Politics of Evidence (n 6), pp 9 and 58; J Parkhurst, ‘Appeals to 
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establishing an evidence-based approach in macroprudential policymaking and using it as a  
key rhetoric tool when communicating decisions to the relevant stakeholders and the public at  
large. First, an evidence-based approach can enhance the legitimacy and accountability of  
macroprudential supervisors and second, it can serve as a strong counterbalance to their  
inherent inaction bias. 
  
1.1 Evidence-based approach as a mechanism to enhance legitimacy and 
accountability  
The construction of a macroprudential framework commonly relies on systemic risk, as the 
leading index used to indicate the build-up of financial instability.13 To be differentiated from 
monetary policy, the field of macroprudential policy lacks a symmetrical and precise target. 
In other words, it is impossible (at least at this stage) to define it in terms of - no less than X 
and no more than Y failures.14 In the absence of a clear benchmark, the task of holding 
macroprudential supervisors accountable becomes a very challenging one. Simply put, a 
financial crisis equals financial instability and signifies the failure of the macroprudential 
supervisor in achieving its mission. The opposite, however, cannot be said. The absence of a 
crisis does not necessarily equate to an effective macroprudential policymaking. The crisis 
may be waiting around the corner or it may take time to approach the tipping point.15 
Currently, there is still confusion about what types of risks are truly systemic and there does 
not seem to be a commonly accepted definition of systemic risks or a comprehensive and 
conclusive list of ‘red flags’ to identify it.16 Indeed, the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) Vice-Chair correctly observed that ‘systemic risk can mean almost anything (or 
                                                          
Evidence for the Resolution of Wicked Problems: The Origins and Mechanisms of Evidentiary Bias’ (2016) 
49(4) Policy Sciences 373. 
13 P Angelini and others, ‘Macroprudential, Microprudential and Monetary Policy: Conflicts, Complementarities 
and Trade-offs’ [2012] Bank of Italy Occasional Papers 140. 
14 L Garicano and R Lastra, ‘Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles’ (2010) LSE 
Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 990. Martin Taylor, an external member of the FPC 
observed in a Questionnaire for Treasury Select Committee (21 March 2018) that – “Compared with our 
colleagues on the MPC (Monetary Policy Committee- my addition), who can have a lively debate backed up 
with hard data about whether some variable should be 0.1 higher or lower, we are dealing with very rough 
judgements, where probabilities are imprecise”. 
15 C Borio, ‘Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation’ (2003) BIS 
Working Paper 128 suggested that ‘Indicators of risk perceptions tend to decline during the upswing and, in 
some cases, to be lowest close to the peak of the financial cycle. But this is precisely the point where, with 
hindsight at least, we can tell that risk was greatest…’. 
16 L Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 163; P Smaga, ‘The Concept 
of Systemic Risk’ (August 2014) Systemic Risk Centre Special Paper No 5; P Hansen, ‘Challenges in 
Identifying and Measuring Systemic Risk’ (2012) NBER Working Paper No. 18505; J Caruana, ‘Measuring 
Systemic Risk’ in A Dmobert and O Lucius Stability of the Financial System Illusion or Feasible Concept? 
(Edward Elgar, 2013), 216. 
6 
 
nothing), depending on whom you ask’.17 Macroprudential policy decision making is, 
therefore, conducted in a fuzzy environment18 and leaves a wide scope of discretion to 
macroprudential supervisors.19 Furthermore, macroprudential tools can have a distributional 
effect and thus subject macroprudential supervisors to political pressure. For instance, 
imposing and adjusting Loan-to-Value (LTV) caps20 may reduce access to finance for often 
younger and economically weak segments of the society and exclude potential first-time 
home-buyers from the property market.21 Politicians are particularly keen to support these 
segments of the electorate and accordingly, the risk of pressure on macroprudential 
supervisors not to inhibit beneficial homeownership democratisation may increase.22 Finally, 
the implementation of macroprudential instruments is likely to take place during an upswing 
when the danger to financial stability is least apparent, thereby rendering the decision to 
implement them very unpopular and may result in macroprudential supervisors facing 
political and market resistance.23  
In this environment, evidence could be used as a mechanism to ameliorate or even 
‘neutralise’ potential political pressure and lobbying from the financial industry.24 In other 
words, framing macroprudential supervision and/or regulation as an evidence-based policy 
                                                          
17 S Cecchetti, ‘Measuring Systemic Risk’ in S Gerlac, E Gnan and J Ulbrich (eds) The ESRB at 1 (SUERF-The 
European Money and Finance Forum, Vienna, December 2012), 25.  
18 G Schultz and J Taylor, ‘A conversation about Key Conclusions’ in K Scott, G Shultz, J Taylor (eds) Ending 
Governments Bailouts as We Know Them (Hoover Press, 2010), 285 refer to systemic risk as a “fuzzy concept. 
The term fuzzy is borrowed from the regional studies dicipline and ‘posits an entity, phenomenon or process 
which possesses two or more alternative meanings and thus cannot be reliably identified or applied by different 
readers or scholars’. A Markusen, ‘Fuzzy Concepts, Scanty Evidence, Policy Distance: The Case for Rigour and 
Policy Relevance in Critical Regional Studies’ (1999) 33(9) Regional Studies 869, 870.  
19 Still, their discretion is constrained by their mandate, decision-making processes and accountability 
mechanisms. Similar to the ‘constrained discretion’ which was coined in the context of monetary policy 
inflation-targeting by B Bernanke and F Mishkin, ‘Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy’ 
(1997) NEBR Working Paper No 5893.  
20 LTV is the ratio of the loan value to the underlying collateral (property) value and a cap on it ensures that if 
the borrower defaults, the collateral value is sufficient to cover the loan. 
21 The Turner Review: A regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (2009), 110; C Goodhart, ‘The 
Macro-prudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability’ (2011) 2 OECD Journal Financial Market 
Trends, 17. 
22 A Keller “The Possible Distributional Effect of the Loan-to-value Ratio and Its Use as a Macro-prudential 
Tool by the European Systemic Risk Board” (2013) 28(7) JIBLR 266 
23 Often described as ‘taking the punch bowl just as the party gets going’, a famous phrase of Jr W McChesney 
Address before the NY Group of the Investment Bankers Association of America’ (NY, 19 October 1955), 12. 
24 In public policy see G Banks, Evidence-based Policy Making: What is it? How Do We Get it? (Australian 
National University Public Lecture Series, Canberra, 4 February 2009).  
But see evidence of one of the external members of the FPC who suggested that in the UK, there is no pressure 
for a light touch regulation, despite what one might expect as a potential result of Brexit: Written Evidence 
submitted by Donald Khan in Response to questionnaire from Treasury Committee, 21 March 2018 available at 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasury-
committee/reappointment-of-donald-kohn-to-the-financial-policy-committee/written/81464.pdf> accessed 10 
June 2018.  
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can enhance both the legitimacy and accountability of macroprudential supervisors.25 It can 
enhance legitimacy – since the public and other stakeholders are well informed about the 
justifications to the policy decision making26 and it can enhance accountability – since it 
provides a benchmark against which the macroprudential supervisor’s performance can be 
assessed. However, the use of the term evidence-based policy purely as a rhetorical device27 
is not sufficient in promoting good governance. Part 3 of this paper suggests that evidence-
based rhetoric should be accompanied by solid independence, accountability, transparency 
and diversity arrangements. 
 
1.2 An evidence-based approach as a counterbalance to macroprudential 
supervisors’ inherent inaction bias 
It is widely acknowledged that macroprudential supervisors are subject to an inherent 
inaction bias.28 The causes of this inherent bias are varied and can be attributed to the unique 
nature of the policy, its tools and the environment in which it operates. First, as discussed in 
section 1.1, macroprudential decisions often involve tangible and potentially large short-term 
costs29 whilst their intangible benefits can only be appreciated in the long-term. The potential 
unpopularity of macroprudential policy decisions results in increased risk of political pressure 
and lobbying from the financial industry to avoid or delay the implementation of the tools or 
at least tune down their intensity.30 Second, the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of 
                                                          
25 See, for instance, the OECD Public Governance Reviews: Estonia and Finland 2015, 113. “Across the OECD, 
good governance practice suggests that policy should be based on sound evidence derived from rigorous 
analysis of the available facts on the issue that the policy is supposed to address”.  
26 F Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP, 1999); V Schmidt, ‘Democracy and 
Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput”’ (2013) 61(1) Political Studies 2 
The most compatible model of legitimacy to macroprudential policy sphere is throughput legitimacy which 
focuses on the quality of the governance processes and is judged in terms of efficacy, accountability and 
transparency of those processes along with their inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people. A 
Keller, ‘Independence, Accountability and Transparency – Are the Conventional Accountability Mechanisms 
Suitable for the European Systemic Risk Board?’ (2017) 5 International Company and Commercial Law Review 
178. 
27 M Hammersley, ‘Is the Evidence-based Practice Movement Doing More Good than Harm?’ (2005) 1(1) 
Evidence and Policy 85, 94-95 strongly opposed an evidence-based approach referring to it as a rhetorical ploy 
which can “serve as an ideological device that closes down discussion about the relative weight that should be 
given to different educational goals’.  With good governance, however, this use can be avoided.  
28 This is acknowledged by macroprudential supervisors themselves. ESRB, ‘The ESRB Handbook on 
Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector’ (Working Group chaired by A Houben, De 
Nederlandsche Bank) available at <www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140303_flagship_report.pdf> accessed 
19 April 2018, p 4.  
29 For instance, while a Countercyclical buffer is primarily aimed at countering the cyclical phases of financial 
markets to ensure financial stability, it might have an unintended impact of reduced flow of credit to the 
economy by more than is warranted. ESRB (2014) (n 28).  
30 This was the case in Israel, J Greenberg, ‘Housing Protests Galvanize Young Israelis’ The Washington Post 
(26 July 2011) <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-26/world/35236637_1_rothschild-boulevard-tent-
city-tent-camp> accessed 20 June 2018; In Norway see SP Chun, Macroprudential Lessons for the Bank of 
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macroprudential tools and their interaction with other macroprudential tools, other policy 
tools and the real economy is still in its infancy. It is, therefore, highly difficult, if not 
impossible, to calibrate pre-defined triggers for the implementation of macroprudential 
tools.31 In the absence of a rule-based framework for the implementation of the tools, the 
discretion of macroprudential supervisors is wide and correspondingly, the potential for 
inaction bias is exacerbated. Third, macroprudential supervisors are often required to achieve 
multiple objectives, with financial stability as a primary objective in priority to sustaining 
economic growth.32 These objectives are not always aligned, at least in the short-medium 
term, and trade-offs can easily emerge33 potentially inducing inaction bias.34 Fourth, the 
global nature of financial markets and the potential systemic risk spillovers across borders, 
exacerbate inaction bias at the national and global level,35 particularly in the absence of 
reciprocity arrangements and coordination mechanisms. Finally, macroprudential supervisors 
are no different from other institutions that are driven by humans and are subject to the more 
general behavioural phenomenon of disaster myopia. This bias leads to the systematic 
                                                          
England Telegraph (21 June 2014) available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/bank-of-
england/10917303/Macroprudential-lessons-for-the-Bank-of-England.html> accessed 10 June 2018.  
31 I Agur and S Sharma, ‘Rules, Discretion and Macro-prudential Policy’ (2013) IMF Working Paper 65;   
D Bonfim and N Monteiro, ‘The Implementation of Countercyclical Capital Buffer: Rules v Discretion’ Banque 
De Portugal Financial Stability Report 2013 observed that “it is unfeasible to find an indicator (or set of 
indicators) that perfectly signals when to activate and deactivate the buffer in all countries and in all possible 
periods.” The normative question of whether macroprudential decision making should be rule-based is outside 
the scope of this paper. See discussion in C Goodhart, ‘The Macroprudential Authority: Powers, Scope and 
Accountability (2011) 2 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends.  
Interestingly, however, recent research suggests that, in fact, the need of macroprudential supervisors to learn 
about the relatively untested tools speak to more active policymaking. See S Bahaj and A Foulis 
‘Macroprudential Policy under Uncertainty’ Bank of England Working Paper No 584.  
32 The FPC’s mandate includes the requirement to sustain economic growth as a secondary objective to financial 
stability; European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation of 22 December 2011 on the Macro-prudential 
Mandate of National Authorities, ESRB/20211/3, Recommendation A; Art 123 of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
requires that the Financial Stability Oversight Council conducts a study every five years on the impact on long-
term growth of potential regulatory actions that are intended to reduce systemic risk. 
33 FPC's Formal Response on the 26 June 2013 to the Remit and Recommendations set out by HM Treasury on 
the 30 April 2013 regarding the Responsibility of the FPC in relation to Support for the Government’s 
Economic Policy and matters to which the it should have regard in Exercising its Functions’. 
See also A Popov and F Smets, ‘On the Tradeoff between Growth and Stability: The Role of Financial Markets” 
VoxEU (November 2011). 
34 For a discussion of the need to redraft the FPC mandate to make it less restrictive see Joint Committee Draft 
Financial Services Bill: Session 2010-12 Report, HL Paper 236 HC 1447, para 371.  
In a multitask environment an agent’s attention may be focused on the task that is easier to measure resulting in 
inaction regarding the other task(s). See B Holmstrom and P Milgrom, ‘Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: 
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design’ (1991) 7 Journal of Law Economics and Organization 
24; B Holmstrom and P Milgrom, ‘The Firm as an Incentive System’ (1994) 84(4) American Economic Review 
972. 
35 J Vinals and E Nier, ‘Collective Action Problems in Macroprudential Policy and the Need for International 
Coordination’ (2014) Banque de France Financial Stability Review, issue 18, pp 39-46. 
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tendency to underestimate the probability of rare events with very large potential effects.36 
The disaster myopia is associated with two heuristics (simplifying processes or rules of 
thumb) that are prevalent in decision making under uncertainty. The first, the availability 
heuristic, was formulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) who suggested that “a person is 
said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by 
the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind.”37 The second, the 
threshold heuristic, suggests that when a probability reaches some critically low level, it is 
treated as if it were zero.38 Combined together, these heuristics, though formulated in the 
cognitive psychology, apply to economic agents39, financial institutions40 and 
macroprudential supervisors and/or regulators.41 Indeed, the difficulty in making an unbiased 
judgment in macroprudential policymaking and going against the natural perception that ‘this 
time is different’42 is a real challenge rather than a theoretical one. It is reflected in the 
evidence of one member of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC)43: “… perhaps most 
dangerous, the lapse of time since the crisis makes it harder to maintain the necessary 
vigilance.”44 
In an environment where inaction bias is heightened, an evidence-based approach can 
constitute a counterweight to inaction bias and tip the balance to action in order to prevent or 
mitigate systemic risks to financial stability. This can be thought of in terms of ‘comply or 
explain’. Where evidence exists and points to the need to act, there will be a need for the 
macroprudential supervisors to be transparent and explain the reasons for inaction and in turn, 
be accountable if that inaction does not meet their objective(s). In contrast, where decision 
                                                          
36 J Guttentag and R Herring, ‘Disaster Myopia in International Banking’ in Essays in International Finance No 
164 (Princeton University, 1986), 3.  
37 A Tversky and D Kahneman, ‘Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability’ (1973) 5(2) 
Cognitive Psychology 207, 208.  
38 HA Simon, ‘Rationality as Process and as Product of Thoughts’ (1978) 68 American Economic Review 1. 
39 Guttentag and Herring (n 36).  
40 AG Haldane, ‘Why Banks Failed the Stress Tests’ (Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing, 9-10 
February 2009).   
41 AG Haldane, ‘Central Bank Psychology Leadership: Stress and Hubris Conference hosted by the Royal 
Society of Medicine, London 17 November 2014 discusses other potential biases in policymaking.  
42 On this recurrent syndrome in the history of crises see C Reinhart and K Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight 
Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton Press, 2011) 
43 The objective of the FPC is to identify, monitor and take action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a 
view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system. Band of England Act 1998, s 9C.  
44 Questionnaire for Treasury Select Committee, Martin Taylor, External member of the FPC, 21 March 2018 
available at <www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/about/people/martin-taylor/martin-taylor-
questionnaire-2018.pdf> accessed 25 May 2018. Empirical evidence suggests that financial cycles last on 
average between 16 to 20 years, see M Drehmann and others, ‘Characterising the Financial Cycle: Don’t Lose 
Sight of the Medium Term!’ (2012) BIS Working Paper No 380.  
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making is not based on good evidence45 (and as we shall see, supported by good governance), 
inaction bias is likely to prevail, and no clear benchmark will be available to hold 
macroprudential supervisors accountable.   
 
2. Challenges of an evidence-based approach in macroprudential policymaking 
This part of the paper explores the challenges and limitations of conducting an evidence-
based macroprudential policy. It exposes the potential biases which could emerge throughout 
the macroprudential supervisory cycle: beginning with the collection of evidence; the 
analysis of the evidence to form a policy decision; the collection of evidence to evaluate the 
impact of the policy decisions and the effectiveness of the implemented tools in achieving the 
macroprudential supervisor’s objective(s). In each stage of the macroprudential 
policymaking, supervisors are subject to biases, some are general biases inherent in human 
behaviour and in particular in a committee setting and some may be unique or more 
prominent in the context of macroprudential supervision.  
 
2.1 Issue bias: choosing which evidence to collect 
The choice of evidence and its source clearly influence decisions and can in itself be regarded 
as a value-based exercise.46 Issue bias can arise through practices that routinely privilege the 
choice of a particular type of evidence or the way it is analysed. Nancy Krieger, who was a 
social epidemiologist, has famously noted that ‘if you don’t ask, you don’t know, and if you 
don’t know, you can’t act’.47 This observation applies to the macroprudential supervisors’ 
decision making in full force. As discussed in Part 1, systemic risk is a multi-faceted concept: 
it is cross-jurisdictional, exogenous and/or endogenous and is not restricted to specific 
sectors, entities, practices or products. Therefore, sources of financial instability go beyond 
traditional banking intermediation and evidence collected for macroprudential purposes 
should be first and foremost comprehensive and cast the net wide.48 Unfortunately and 
despite global initiatives to close data gaps beyond the banking sector, macroprudential 
supervisors acknowledge that so far, their efforts have concentrated on the banking sector and 
                                                          
45 See note 7 on what will be considered good evidence for macroprudential purposes.   
46 H Douglas, ‘Politics and Science: Untangling Values, Ideologies and Reasons’ (2015) 658(1) ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 296.  
47 N Krieger, ‘The Making of Public Health Data: Paradigms, Politics and Policy’ (1992) 13(4) Journal Public 
Health Policy 412, 412. 
48 On other vital data qualities for macroprudential purposes see A Keller, ‘Collecting Data: How will the ESRB 
Overcome the First Hurdle Towards Effective Macroprudential Supervision? (2013) 24(4) European Business 
Law Review 487. 
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that there is still an urgent need to expand the scope of their data collection beyond that 
sector.49  
It may be that this issue bias reflects the key role that central banks play in the governance of 
macroprudential supervisors50 (and hence an inherent groupthink) or results from the 
perception which prevailed following the 2007-2009 financial crisis that banking (and mainly 
banking) is a source of systemic risk.51 Either way, the tendency of macroprudential 
supervisors to collect data on the banking sector may shift the priority and attention of their 
decisions to the banking sector compared to other sectors such as insurance or the shadow 
banking sectors as well as systemically important infrastructures such as Central 
Counterparties.52 Indeed, recent evidence on the global use of macroprudential tools suggests 
that to date, most of the implemented instruments are bank-focused.53 The move towards a 
more market-based financial system underscores the urgency of addressing this issue bias in 
macroprudential policymaking.54  
                                                          
49 IMF, ‘What are the Data Needs?’ (2017) Working Paper Financial Stability Analysis No 153. Since the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis there has been intensified effort to close data gaps for macroprudential purposes, 
FSB-IMF, “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps” 2009; IMF and FSB, ‘The Financial Crisis and 
Information Gaps – Sixth Implementation Progress Report of the G20 Data Gaps Initiative’ 2015. The ESRB 
publishes the “EU Shadow Banking Monitor” which presents an overview of developments in the European 
shadow banking system to identify risks to financial stability. 
50 M Goldby and A Keller, ‘Oversight of Systemically Relevant Insurance Practices within the EU: The Role of 
Macroprudential Supervision in Systemic Risk and the Future of Insurance Regulation (Routledge, 1st edt, 
2015).  
51 In the EU, the focus on the banking sector may be a result of the experience from the Eurozone crisis 
beginning in 2012 and the evident doom-loop between the banking sector and sovereign debt. See R Baldwin 
and F Giavazzi, ‘The Eurozone Crisis: A Consensus View of the Causes and Few Possible Solutions’ September 
2015 VoxEU.org.  
52 In a recent strategy paper, the ESRB highlighted the need to monitor and develop new macroprudential tools, 
to address risks beyond the banking sector, for example risks stemming from asset managers and funds, 
financial market infrastructures, insurers and hedge funds. ESRB, Strategy Paper Beyond Banking, July 2016 
available at <www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/20160718_strategy_paper_beyond_banking.en.pdf> accessed 
25 May 2018. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has recently observed that – “Although progress is being 
made, more work is needed to monitor and respond to potential shadow banking risks. An FSB peer review 
concluded that FSB jurisdictions should establish a systematic process for assessing shadow banking risks, and 
ensure that any non-bank financial entities or activities that could pose material financial stability risks are 
brought within the regulatory perimeter; address identified gaps in the availability of data to assess financial 
stability risks, taking into account the potential materiality of those risks; and remove impediments to 
cooperation and information-sharing between authorities, including on a cross-border basis”, FSB, 
Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms: 3rd Annual Report, 3 July 2017, 16.  
53 K Jayaram and B Gadanecz, ‘Macroprudential Policy Frameworks, Instruments and Indicators: A Review’ 
2016 in Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Combining Micro and Macro Data for Financial Stability 
Analysis, volume 41, 13.  
Although mandates of macroprudential supervisors expand beyond the banking sector. See, for instance, article 
3 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on European Union Macro-prudential Oversight of 
the Financial System and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board OJ L331/1; S 9C of the BEA 1998.  
54 On the progress made so far see Vítor Constâncio, Macroprudential Stress-tests and Tools for the Non-bank 
Sector (ESRB Annual Conference Frankfurt am Main, 22 September 2017).  
See also J Cunliffe, Market-based Finance: a Macroprudential View (Asset Management Derivatives Forum, 
Dana Point, California, 9 February 2017).  
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2.2 Using evidence: The danger of ‘It worked there, it will work here” 
Other biases can emerge at the implementation stage of macroprudential instruments and the 
evaluation of their effectiveness. In macroprudential policymaking, there is no “one-size fits 
all” approach. Therefore, “it worked there” does not necessarily equates to – “it works 
here”.55 A country’s features and circumstances, such as the structure of its banking and non-
banking sector, homeownership, monetary policy, the phase of the financial cycle or the 
business cycle and other political economy considerations, will all have an impact on the 
effectiveness of the macroprudential tools in preventing or mitigating systemic risks.56 The 
effectiveness of these tools also often depends on their reciprocal implementation across 
borders.57  
The evaluation of the effectiveness of macroprudential tools suffers from several 
limitations. It is difficult to isolate the effect of a macroprudential tool from the effect of 
other macroprudential tools or from the effect of tools utilised by other policies given that 
policy tools are often used in conjunction.58 In addition, the common use of a dummy (binary 
approach) to assess the effectiveness of macroprudential tools does not account for the 
magnitude of the tools and/or fine-tuning of the tools that may follow the implementation 
stage and therefore, may not accurately reflect their effectiveness.59 It is, therefore, essential 
that macroprudential supervisors are wary of the difficulty in transposing evidence on 
macroprudential tools based on experience in other jurisdictions without a careful assessment 
of local conditions and their impact on the suitability of the tools, their effectiveness and any 
potential negative spillovers to other policy areas. 
                                                          
55 J Hardie and N Cartwright, Evidence-based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better (OUP, 2012), pp 7-8.  
56 International Monetary Fund, ‘Macro-prudential Policy; What Instruments and How to Use them? Lessons 
from Country Experiences’ (2011) IMF Working Papers 11/238.  
57 Exposure-based measures in particular require reciprocity to ensure their effectiveness. ESRB, A Review of 
Macroprudential Policy in the EU in 2016, April 2017, pp 54-55 explains that “The high prevalence of cross-
border lending in the EU means that some of the exposures held and thereby risks taken by foreign banks may 
fall outside the scope of national macroprudential measures. Measures taken by Member States generally apply 
to domestic banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks, but not to the branches of foreign banks or to services that 
are provided directly across borders. As a result, depending on the domicile of the financial services provider, a 
different set of (macro)prudential requirements may be applicable to the same risk exposure in one country. This 
regulatory loophole may lead to unintended consequences, i.e. leakages and regulatory arbitrage with the 
potential to undermine the effectiveness of the national macroprudential measure as well as external effects on 
other Member States. To mitigate these unintended consequences, reciprocity is required for exposure-based 
measures…” 
58G Galati and R Moessner, ‘What Do We Know About the Effects of Macroprudential Policy?’ (March 2017) 
LSE Economica, 13.  
59 Ursula Vogel Deutsche Bundesbank, Presentation at the Joint ECB and Banco de Portugal Conference on 
‘The Use of Narrative Information in Assessing the Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies’ Lisbon, 17 
November 2017. 
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2.3 Selection and analysis of evidence: Groupthink 
The theory of groupthink was first developed by the social psychologist Irving Janis in the 
early 70s. Groupthink refers to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when 
concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override 
realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action.60 In other words, groupthink is the 
tendency among homogeneous, cohesive groups to consider issues only within a certain 
paradigm and not challenge its basic premises.61 Similar to market bubbles and manias or the 
behaviour of financial firms, regulators and supervisors can often act “colour-blind in a sea of 
red flags”.62 Benabaou observed that “In the aftermath of corporate and public-sector 
disasters, it often emerges that participants fell prey to a collective form of willful blindness 
and overconfidence: mounting warning signals were systematically cast aside or met with 
denial, evidence avoided or selectively reinterpreted, dissenters shunned.”63  
Macroprudential supervisors are no exception. Most macroprudential legal frameworks 
give central banks a key role, either in the form of central banks having a macroprudential 
policy mandate or as dominant voting members in an independent and separate 
macroprudential committee or board.64 Having central banks on board has clear advantages, 
primarily, utilising their technical expertise, enhancing information flow and coordination 
between macroprudential and monetary policy setters.65 It allows for a relatively new policy 
area to benefit from the long-established and hard-won independence and credibility of 
central banks. Notwithstanding these considerations, excessive insularity may increase the 
tendency for groupthink in the macroprudential decision-making process.66 Voicing this 
                                                          
60 I L Janis, ‘Groupthink’ (1971) Psychology Today Magazine 84; See also I L Janis, Groupthink: Psychological 
Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin, 2nd ed, 1982). A Sibert, 
‘Central Banking by Committee’ (2006) De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper 91 identified the following 
factors as leading to groupthink: Insulation from outsiders; Lack of diversity in viewpoints and leaders actively 
advocating solutions. 
61 IMF, IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis (2011) IMF Surveillance in 
2004–07 (2011) Evaluation Repot, 17.   
62 The expression is borrowed from F Norris, “Color-Blind Merrill in a Sea of Red Flags” (New York Times, 16 
May 2008). 
63 R Benbaou, ‘Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organisations and Markets’ (2013) 80 Review of Economic 
Studies (2013) 80, 429.  
64 ME Rochelle and N Liang, ‘New Financial Stability Governance Structures and Central Banks’, August 2017 
Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings Working Paper 32.   
65 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU chaired by J de Larosière Report, Brussels, 25 
February 2009, paras 174-178.  
See also S Mckphilmey, ‘Integrating Macro-prudential Policy: Central Banks as the ‘Third force’ in EU 
Financial Reform’ (2016) 39(3) West European Politics 526.   
66 W Buiter highlighted other potential problems with assigning a leading role to the ECB in the governance of 
the ESRB such as potential conflict of interests between the monetary and macroprudential supervision role and 
undermining the independence of the ECB. W Buiter, ‘The Proposed European Systemic Risk Board is 
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concern, the Financial Stability Board has warned that in the UK centralising supervisory and 
systemic roles within the Bank of England increases the potential of creating a groupthink 
mentality.67 Similarly, a recent independent review of the cultural change in UK financial 
regulators suggested that more needs to be done to prevent groupthink.68  
Whilst the UK Parliament was cognisant of groupthink and put in place mechanisms to 
depolarise and diversify the deliberations within the FPC, it remains a strong force that is 
hard to overcome. As one of the external members of the FPC, self-reflective comments 
suggest that– “the trouble is the more time you stay there (i.e. Bank of England, my addition), 
the more you become imbued in its atmosphere and tend to agree with it…”.69 As we shall 
see in the continuation article, the inclusion of external members in macroprudential 
committees is a necessary but not sufficient antidote to groupthink. Other factors, such as the 
decision-making rule (consensus or vote), the nature and the transparency of the 
deliberation,70 also have an impact on the degree of groupthink and should be carefully 
considered when designing the governance of macroprudential supervisors.  
 
2.4 What to do when there is no evidence? Should the precautionary principle be a 
guiding principle in the macroprudential supervision sphere?   
Given that systemic risk analysis is in its infancy, evidence may simply not be out there. It 
may be that it is outside of the regulatory perimeter and evidence is not being collected (in 
other words, there is an issue bias) or it may be that there are signs for a build-up of systemic 
risk but there is no evidence of its magnitude or the tools that should be implemented to 
address it.71 By and large, macroprudential policy can be viewed as being in the stage of 
                                                          
Overweight by Central Banks’ Willem Buiter’s Mavercon (28 October 2009) <http://blogs.ft.com> accessed 20 
May 2018.   
67 FSB, Peer-Review of the UK (September 2013) available at <www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130910.pdf> accessed 25 May 2018, on p 18.  
For a reply to the concerns of groupthink within the FPC see M Taylor, The Committee of Public Safety 
(Institute of International Monetary Research, 7 November 2017).   
68 A Spicer and others, ‘Cultural Change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England Practising What We Preach?’ 
Report of New City Agency and Cass Business (October 2016) available at <http://newcityagenda.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/NCA-Cultural-change-in-regulators-report_embargoed.pdf> accessed 25 May 2018.  
69 M Taylor in the Treasury Select Committee Hearing on 18 April 2018, at approximately 16:18 minutes into 
the hearing.  
70 J Barabas ‘How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions’ (2004) 98(4) American Political Science Review 687, 
699 explains that ‘Deliberation is an enlightened and open-minded search for consensus amid diverse 
participants.” These procedural requirements of open-mindless and diversity of deliberation differentiate it from 
ordinary discussion.  
71 For instance, the FSB Thematic Review on the Implementation of the FSB Policy Framework for Shadow 
Banking Entities (May 2016) available at  <www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Shadow-banking-peer-
review.pdf> accessed 25 May 2018 identified data limitation as well as unavailability of policy tools with the 
aim of  assessing and responding to potential shadow banking risks posed by non-bank financial entities. 
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“learning by doing”72 or evidence-in the making, often conducted by trial and error.73 This 
may clearly inhibit the quality of the decision-making process of macroprudential supervisors 
and in particular, the timeliness and the effectiveness of their decisions and policy tools. 
Acknowledging these limitations, officials at the Bank of England have recently suggested 
that macroprudential supervisors should apply the precautionary principle in their decision-
making process.74 But could (and should) the precautionary principle be used as a panacea for 
the absence of sufficient evidence for macroprudential purposes?  
The precautionary principle was initially utilised in environmental law and 
subsequently in other disciplines75 to address the need to act where rigorous and tested 
evidence is absent. It is defined in the Principles of the United Nations Environment Program, 
as follows: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation”.76 A similar principle is enshrined in Article 191(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU77 and the UK has implemented a precautionary approach, as 
early as 1990, in setting its environmental policies.78  
Since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there is a growing body of literature on the 
application of theories, which were developed in relation to ecosystems, as a useful 
framework for designing and developing financial regulation and in particular, 
                                                          
72 D Aikman and others, ‘Rethinking Financial Stability’ (2018) Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 712 
available at <www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2018/rethinking-financial-
stability.pdf> accessed 25 May 2018.  
73 A Haldane and R May, ‘Systemic Risk in the Banking Ecosystems’ (2011) 469 Nature 351; A Baker, 
‘Political Economy and the Paradoxes of Macroprudential Regulation’ (2017) Sheffield Political Economy 
Research Institute Paper No 40, 4.    
74A Foulis and S Bahaj , ‘Uncertainty is No excuse for Not Using Macroprudential Tools’ (2016) 
BankUndeground available at <https://bankunderground.co.uk/2016/01/29/uncertainty-is-no-excuse-for-not-
using-macroprudential-tools/> accessed 25 May 2018;  S Bahaj and A Foulis, ‘Macroprudential Policy under 
Uncertainty’ (January 2016) Bank of England Working Paper No 584 though the latter does not refer to the 
precautionary principle.  
See also I Webb, D Baumslag and R Read, ‘How Should Regulators Deal with the Uncertainty? Insights from 
the Precautionary Principle’ (2017) BankUnderground available at 
<https://bankunderground.co.uk/2017/01/27/how-should-regulators-deal-with-uncertainty-insights-from-the-
precautionary-principle/> accessed 25 May 2018. 
The proposal to apply the precautionary principal in financial stability regulation is not new. See ST Omarova, 
‘License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products’, available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996755> accessed 10 June 2018, p 21; HJ Hellen, ‘A New Philosophy For Financial 
Stability Regulation’ (2013) 45 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 173 also advocates the use of 
precautionary principle in financial stability regulation.  
75 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles from Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP, 2002), 93.  
76 United Nations Environment Program, Declaration of the Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
June 1992, Principle 15.   
77 Of 26 October 2012 OJ C 326. 
78 This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy, Her Majesty’s Government Cm 1200 (London 
Sept. 1990). 
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macroprudential policy.79 Financial systems and environmental systems share some 
commonalities and face similar challenges. Both are complex systems which are potentially 
exposed to shocks with low probability but high impact.80 Furthermore, financial systems and 
environmental systems are adaptive and evolving.81 The complexity and the evolving nature 
of financial markets make them inherently difficult to predict, as was evident in the 
securitisation breakdown during the 2007-2009 financial crisis:  
“…complexity obscures the past and the present and makes the future harder to predict. 
Particularly where evolution is accelerating, and new complexities are emerging, it gets easier 
and easier to make mistakes. In many ways, the breakdown in the securitization process was 
due to the fact that it was rapidly evolving – becoming more complex, etiolated and very 
opaque. Few market practitioners and fewer regulators understood it from stem to stern soon 
enough to do anything about it.”82 
In such an uncertain environment, the precautionary principle can alleviate the 
inherent inaction bias of macroprudential supervisors. But is the precautionary principle at 
odds with the strong rationales discussed in Part 1, which clearly support an evidence-based 
approach in that sphere?83 Could its application jeopardise the ability of market participants 
to take risks so very vital for the effective operation of financial markets? 
Taleb and Read, two scholars from the NYU School of Engineering and School of 
Philosophy, explore the nuances of the precautionary principle and sketch out its 
boundaries.84 They draw a distinction between decisions with a risk of harm which does not 
warrant the precautionary principle and decisions with a risk of total ruin which does warrant 
                                                          
79 AG Haldane and RM May, ‘Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems’ (2011) 469 Nature 351; C Taylor, 
Evolution and Macro-Prudential Regulation (American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 2011); National 
Research Council. 2007. New Directions for Understanding Systemic Risk: A Report on a Conference 
Cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the National Academy of Sciences (The National 
Academies Press, Washington DC, 2007).   
80 S Battiston and others, ‘Complexity Theory and Financial Regulation’ (2016) 351(6275) Science 818-819; D 
Awrey, ‘Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ (2011) University of Oxford 
Legal Research Paper No. 49, 38. 
On exposure to catastrophic and irreversible shocks and how environmental regulation addresses these risks via 
the precautionary principle see C Sunstein, ‘Irreversible and Catastrophic’ (2005-2006) 91 Cornell Law Review 
841, 842. 
81 Given that both systems operate in a changing and resource-constrained environment. Taylor (n 77), 6.  
82 Taylor (n 79), p 15; See also S L Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ (2009) 87(2) 
Washington University Law Review 211.  
83 Although the precautionary principle may be a barrier to evidence-based policy-making, this is not always the 
case. Under certain circumstances, it can be enabling by encouraging policy makers to engage with the 
evidence.  M Monaghan, Mark, R Pawson and K Wicker, ‘The Precautionary Principle and Evidence-Based 
Policy’ (2012) 8(2) Evidence and Policy 171.  
84 N Taleb, R Read and others, ‘The Precautionary Principle (with Application to the Genetic Modification of 
Organisms)’ (2014) NYU School of Engineering Working Paper Series.  
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the precautionary principle.85 A ruin problem is defined as one where outcomes of risks have 
a non-zero probability of resulting in unrecoverable losses. Taleb and Read argue that when 
assessing the existence of a ruin problem, the focus should be on the aggregate, not at the 
level of single individuals, and on global systemic, not idiosyncratic, harm. The key test to 
define a system which achieves ruin is, therefore, that the system cannot recover. In their 
paper, Taleb and Read further distinguish between the precautionary and the evidentiary 
approach. They suggest that “In an evidentiary approach to risk (relying on evidence-based 
methods), the existence of a risk or harm occurs when we experience that risk or harm. In the 
case of ruin, by the time evidence comes it will, by definition, be too late to avoid it. Nothing 
in the past may predict one fatal event…”.86 Accordingly, they conclude that an evidence-
based approach simply does not work on ruin events.  
But can we borrow these distinctions to macroprudential policymaking and suggest 
that macroprudential supervisors reduce reliance on evidence where there is a risk of a ruin 
event (or more accurately, when their inaction may lead to the materialisation of a ruin 
event)?  
It is suggested here that the application of the precautionary principle meets several 
limitations and challenges87 in the sphere of macroprudential policy.  
First, in the domain of macroprudential policy, we deal, in the first place, with rare 
events with the potential to result in high costs to society if they materialise. This is the 
essence of systemic risks and indeed the essence of policymaking in this area. Therefore, 
applying the precautionary principle in the macroprudential decision-making process is too 
crude88 and could result in a slippery slope where policy actions, to a large extent, are not 
fully supported by evidence. It will introduce another layer of complexity to an already 
complex policy area and decision-making process, as indicated in Part 1. Furthermore, it is 
doubtful whether the right balance between, on the one hand, innovation in financial markets 
and its associated benefits and on the other hand, prevention or mitigation of systemic risks 
can be achieved via the application of the precautionary principle. In practical terms, the 
                                                          
85 This corresponds with the definition of the precautionary principle in the Rio Declaration (n 74).  
86 Taleb and Read (n 84), pp 3-4.  
87 In other areas, the principle is far from being immune to criticism. For instance, in the environmental and 
public health fields see BF Cross, ‘Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, (1993) 53 Washington and 
Lee Law Review 851; GE Marchant, ‘From General Policy to Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of the 
Precautionary Principle’ (2013) 111 Environmental Health Perspectives 1799 who emphasise, in particular, the 
ambiguity of the principle. 
88 CR Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary Principle’ (2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1003, 
1055. 
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precautionary principle may unduly stifle innovation and result in unwarranted costs to the 
real economy.89  
Second, there is a cost to a false alarm or being overly cautious. If macroprudential 
supervisors do indeed act upon the precautionary principle and persistently produce false 
alarms90 their credibility could be severely undermined and consequently, the effectiveness of 
their future policy decisions weakened. Given that the powers of macroprudential supervisors 
are often based on soft law, the effectiveness of their policy decisions heavily depends on 
their reputation and credibility.91 
Finally, and most importantly, embedding the precautionary principle in the 
macroprudential policy decision-making process will require supervisors to distinguish 
between a ruin event and a non-ruin event. It is very difficult, however, to articulate what a 
ruin event means when it is framed in terms of financial stability. The scholars at the Bank of 
England did not go far enough to operationalise the precautionary principle in 
macroprudential policymaking and left the standard for invoking it ambiguous.  
Furthermore, an assessment of the guidance, which was established in other 
disciplines for invoking the precautionary principle, suggests that ruin as a distinguishing 
factor may not be suitable when taking macroprudential policy decisions. Scholarship on the 
precautionary principle presents several formulations ranging from a strong form which 
creates a presumption that regulatory intervention is needed where a private activity poses 
serious risks to important public interest (or take no action unless you are certain that it will 
do no harm) to the weaker version which places the burden on risk creators to overcome a 
                                                          
89 But J Crotty and G Epstein, ‘A Financial Precautionary Principle: New Rules for Financial Products Safety’ 
(July 2009) Wall Street Watch Working Paper No 1, p 4 suggest that financial innovation is often designed “to 
avoid taxes, evade financial regulations and redistribute income from stakeholders or customers to groups within 
the financial commodity chain” whilst there is little evidence on their positive impact on economic growth or 
development. In contrast, see RE Litan, ‘In Defense of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation’ (2010) 
Brookings Institution Research Paper 16 demonstrates that, in fact, there are more- good financial innovations 
than bad ones.  
90 In the absence of a clear guidance to apply it. On the difficulty in balancing the trade-off between false-
positives (missing crises) and false-negative (being overly cautious) see D Bonfim and N Monteiro, ‘The 
Implementation of Countercyclical Buffer: Rules versus Discretion’ (November 2013) Banco de Portugal 
Financial Stability Report, pp 87-110. 
For example, given the relatively long lags in the implementation and impact of the Countercyclical Buffer it 
should be activated relatively early in the financial cycle. This, in turn, increases the possibility of false alarms, 
and thus macroprudential supervisors may set it at low level to mitigate the potential false alarm. Setting the 
level of the Countercyclical buffer too low, however, may have a detrimental effect on its effectiveness. See A 
Houben, R Nijskens and M Teunissen, ‘Putting Macroprudential Policy to Work’ (2014) 12(7) 
DeNederlandscheBank Occasional Studies 27 available at <https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/os7_tcm46-
313965.pdf> accessed 10 June 2018.  
91 E Ferran and K Alexander, ‘Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? The Special Case of the European Systemic 
Risk Board’ (2011) 37(6) European Law Review 751. 
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default response by proving that the risks are acceptable and reasonable.92 Other versions 
differ in the level of uncertainty that is needed to warrant intervention by the regulator and 
the tools used where uncertainty exists.93  
To begin with, it is doubtful whether these formulations are suitable for 
macroprudential supervision. For instance, how could the weaker form of the precautionary 
principle be applied, and the burden of evidence discharged when the private activity which 
may result in a build-up of systemic risk is not confined to a particular product or market? 
Moreover, given that financial stability depends on so many factors, endogenous and 
exogenous, it will be very difficult and costly, if not impossible, for risk creators to 
demonstrate that their activities or products do not create systemic risks to financial stability.  
Similarly, the strong formulation of the precautionary principle is not well suited to 
the macroprudential sphere. It would jeopardise one of the important characteristics of 
financial markets - their adaptability.94 Financial systems are adaptive since they derive not 
only from economic factors but also from social ones. They are dynamic, learn from 
experience, adjust and evolve their response over time.95 Taking a hyper-cautious approach to 
regulation and supervision would stifle financial markets and will inhibit their adaptability. 
Putting this adaptability at risk may, in turn, make financial systems more structurally and 
functionally rigid and prone to contagion. Going back to Taleb and Read’s distinguishing 
factor of a ruin event, a fundamental change in the structure of financial markets, taking place 
as part of their adaptability process, could be considered irreversible and be classified as ruin 
event but is still warranted and will result in beneficial economic growth. Indeed, the use of 
the precautionary principle in the public policy domain as an appropriate guide was 
challenged as follows: “General application of the “trial without error” strong PP 
                                                          
92 Or says that lack of full certainty is not a justification for preventing an action that might be harmful. J Morris, 
Defining the Precautionary Principle in J Morris ed Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 
(Butterworth-Heinenann, Oxford, 2000). 
93 N Sachs, ‘Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle From its Critics’ (2011) University Illinoi Law Review 
1285, 1295; RB Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty in Research in Law 
and Economics (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002) identifies four versions of the precautionary principle. 
94 The capacity to leave a path that may have proven successful in the past in favour of a new trajectory. S 
Dawley, A Pike and J Tomaney,‘Towards the Resilient Region?: Policy Activism and Peripheral Region 
Development’ (2010) Spatial Economics Research Centre Discussion Paper 53. 
95 On the economy as an adaptive complex system see, for instance, JH Holland, ‘The Global Economy as an 
Adaptive Process’ in PW Anderson, KJ Arrow and D Pines (eds), The Economy as an Evolving Complex System 
(Addison-Wesley, 1988); CH Hommes, ‘Financial Markets as Nonlinear Adaptive Evolutionary Systems’ 
(2001) 1(1) Quantitative Finance 149. 
More recently, AW Lo constructs the Adaptive Market Hypothesis based on the insight that operation of 
investors and financial markets is more like biology than physics and suggest that they follow biological laws 
where the key is adaptive behaviours in a shifting environment. A W Lo, Adaptive Markets Financial Evolution 
at the Speed of Thought (Princeton University Press, 2017), pp 3 and 8.  
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(precautionary principle, my addition) may prevent people from making some mistakes, but it 
also prevents them learning from those mistakes and from overcoming the mistakes of the 
past”.96  
It is, therefore, suggested that introducing the precautionary principle to the decision-
making process of macroprudential supervisors would be a dangerous move. Instead, to 
address rare and potentially ruin events with a catastrophic impact, macroprudential 
supervisors should focus, alongside prevention and mitigation of systemic risk, on building 
the resilience of the financial system.97 Resilience preserves the ability of the financial system 
to adapt when faced with shocks in a way that maintains its core functionality (“bounce 
forward”), 98 rather than merely quickly re-bouncing to its previous state. Bouncing forward 
will also enhance the ability of the financial system to withstand or cope with future shocks.99 
In practice, resilience is already being used as a target to guide macroprudential policy 
decisions. One of the FPC’s external member observed that: “…whilst, I’m content that the 
FPC should take account of its indicators and its forecasts, it must always provide for 
resilience and capital strength that takes account of the reality of unpredictable events.”100 
Countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) is an instructive example of a macroprudential tool 
with a stated objective of increasing the resilience of the financial system. It is designed to 
build-up in “good times” during the boom phase and to be released during the bust when 
financial conditions tighten. In its policy statement on the approach to setting CCyB, the FPC 
explained how it corresponds with the evolving nature of financial markets – “…judgement 
plays a material role in all FPC decisions and policy is not mechanically tied to any specific 
set of indicators...The FPC will update this list of indicators over time as it learns from 
                                                          
96 Morris (n 92), 10.  
97 The political scientist, Aaron Wildavsky, rejected the precautionary principle and argued in favour of 
resilience as a guiding principle – “Conservatism in regulation would be appropriate if there were a limited area 
of uncertainty that needed to be bounded…When there is an ocean of ignorance… there is no way of hedging, 
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knowing probabilities of harm? The answer lies in what ecologists call resilience, whereby robust species adapt 
to and surmount newly arising adversities…” A Wildavsky But Is It True?:A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental 
Health and Safety Issues (Harvard University Press, 1995); More recently, GE Marchant and YA Steven, 
‘Resilience: A New Tool in the Risk Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies’ (2017) 51(1) UC Davis 
Law Review 233 support resilience over the precautionary principle in governance of emerging technologies.  
98 i.e. continue to assess, price, allocate, and manage financial risks while facilitating the performance of an 
economy. GJ Schinasi, “Defining Financial Stability” (2004) IMF Working Paper 187, p.6 
99Alternatively, a resilient financial system would possess the ability to withstand the impact of the shock or will 
have a reduced probability of a shock (“shock absorption” aspect). A Keller, ‘The Mandate of the European 
Systemic Risk Board and Resilience as an Essential Component: Part 2’ (2015) 31(2) JIBLR 65. 
100 R Sharp, Financial stability in an Unpredictable World (Nottingham Trent University, 12 October 2015) 
available at <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2015/financial-stability-in-an-
unpredictable-world.pdf> accessed 10 June 2018.  
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experience, as the financial system evolves, as data availability and quality improve, and as 
new research is undertaken...”.101 
 This ‘trial and error’ phase is a clear limitation of an evidence-based approach. The 
answer, however, should not be found in introducing the precautionary principle into the 
macroprudential decision-making process. Rather, alongside monitoring financial markets to 
identify systemic risks macroprudential supervisors should be guided by building up the 
resilience financial systems whilst maintaining their adaptability intact.  
 
Part 3 –independence, accountability, transparency and diversity 
To counter the biases identified in part 2 and mitigate their effect, it is suggested that the 
governance of macroprudential policy supervisors should be based on four building blocks: 
independence, accountability, transparency and diversity.  
To begin with, the traditional trilogy of concepts, independence, accountability and 
transparency, have long been recognised as key pillars in the institutional framework of 
financial supervision and monetary policy and there is a broad consensus on their necessity as 
prerequisites for good governance.102 The basic rationale for delegating authority for 
monetary policy to an independent agency103 equally applies to macroprudential supervision. 
Similar to interest rate policy, elected officials may be tempted to distort macroprudential 
supervision for short-term electoral gain.104 This temptation is all the greater in the 
macroprudential sphere in light of the potential unpopularity and distributional effect of the 
policy decisions, as discussed in Part 1. Accountability, in turn, is vital for legitimising the 
independence of an unelected agency to which powers have been delegated.105 As an 
independent supervisor, to varying degrees, the macroprudential supervisor needs this 
legitimacy as well. Furthermore, the case for transparency in macroprudential supervision is 
very strong. 106 Transparency is an essential component for ensuring the accountability of the 
                                                          
101 The FPC’s Approach to Setting the Countercyclical Capital Buffer, Policy Statement, April 2016.   
102 BS Bernanke, ‘Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability’ (Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 25 May, 2010); D. Masciandaro, P 
Rosaria and M. Quintyn, ‘The Economic Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter?’ (2011) IMF Working Paper 
261, p.6 referring also to integrity as a prerequisite for good governance.  
103 M Quintyn and MW Taylor, ‘Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability’ (2002) IMF 
Working Paper 46.  
104 JM Buchanan and RE Wagner, Democracy in Deficit the Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (New York: 
Academic Press, 1977).  
105 For a similar justification in monetary policy see ECB, ‘Accountability of the ECB’ ECB Monthly Bulletin 
(November 2002). 
106 C Freedman, ‘The Value of Transparency in Conducting Monetary Policy’ (2002) 84 Federal Reserve Bank 
of Saint Louis Review 84, 155; A Blinder and others, ‘How Do Central Bank Talk?’ Geneva Report on the 
World Economy 3 (Geneva: International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, 2001). 
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macroprudential supervisor to the political fora and to the general public. Information 
regarding the conduct of the macroprudential supervisor and its policy decisions is crucial for 
the assessment of its performance and can enhance the legitimacy of its policy decisions.107 
Transparency can also be used as a signalling tool, assist in shaping the future behaviour of 
financial markets and potentially prevent those risks from materialising.108 
Together, independence, accountability and transparency can attenuate or even 
inoculate the biases discussed in part 2. For instance, there is evidence to suggest that 
accountability can reduce some groupthink tendencies, lead to more active participation in 
decision-making and a critical attitude towards group decisions.109 Independence, 
accountability and transparency can also counteract the tendency of macroprudential 
supervisors towards inaction bias and encourage a proactive approach to policy in which 
reasons for taking actions as well as reasons for not taking actions must be justified.110  
In addition to these deeply rooted principles, it is suggested that diversity should also 
form an integral part of the governance of macroprudential supervisors as a key tool to debias 
macroprudential decision making and reinforce its evidence-based approach. Where decisions 
concern complex and ambiguous problems, their quality can be improved through genuine 
deliberation, expression of contrary views, consideration of multiple perspectives and 
evaluation of alternative views.111  
The continuation article therefore, will delve deeper into the concept of diversity and 
explore its nature and key dimensions within the macroprudential policy institutional setting 
and decision-making process. It will draw on the burgeoning scholarship on group decision 
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making, inter alia, in the Organisational Behaviour discipline. In particular, a key stream in 
the behavioural strategy field highlights the importance of diverse groups in reducing 
cognitive biases by fostering information sharing and introducing new perspectives in the 
decision-making process.112 The continuation article, ‘Debiasing Macroprudential Policy: 
Part 2’, will suggest that in order to deliver meaningful diversity that encourages genuine 
deliberation in macroprudential decision-making, a nuanced and non-monolithic approach is 
needed. This means going beyond the heterogeneous composition of the macroprudential 
authority and considering a variety of factors such as the decision-rule, the facilitative rather 
than autocratic role of the chair and the transparency of dissenting viewpoints. By taking this 
approach, diversity can dissipate inherent biases in the macroprudential decision-making 
process and in particular, guard against groupthink. 
 
Conclusion  
Taking an evidence-based approach to inform macroprudential policy decisions appears to be 
the most natural and intuitive approach to an effective macroprudential supervision. This 
approach, however, is fraught with complexity and inherent biases, such as issue bias, 
inaction bias and groupthink. The paper suggests that where comprehensive and timely 
evidence is absent, the precautionary principle may not be the most suitable mechanism, and 
perhaps even a dangerous one, to guide macroprudential policy decisions. Rather, the existing 
rhetoric, often used by macroprudential supervisors, of resilience could serve the same 
purpose and fit in well with the nature and features of the macroprudential sphere.  
Acknowledging the limitations and challenges in taking an evidence-based approach 
in the macroprudential decision-making exposes the need for good governance of evidence. 
This can be achieved through independence and solid accountability and transparency 
arrangements. The article further argues that diversity should be a complementary building 
block in the governance of macroprudential supervisors. External members coming from 
different jurisdictions and backgrounds can assist in challenging existing paradigms, 
debiasing inherent biases and ultimately enhancing the effectiveness of macroprudential 
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policymaking.113 Diversity may challenge the risk that technocrats, captured in a constrained 
frame of conceptions, may fail to identify in-time the build-up of systemic risks.  
                                                          
113 Interestingly, diversity in macroprudential sphere could expand beyond governance and can also relate to the 
range of instruments implemented by macroprudential supervisors. This is consistent with Brainard’s seminal 
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‘Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy’ (1967) 57 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 
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Report (June 2018).   
 
